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Policy Failure and Corruption
in Belgium: Is Federalism to Blame?
JEROEN MAESSCHALCK and STEVEN VAN DE WALLE
Throughout the 1990s, corruption cases, policy failure and scandals tarnished Belgium’s
international reputation. In this article, we analyse the effect of federalism and political
culture on corruption and policy failures and their impact on the likelihood of such
occurrences becoming scandals. Survey material suggests that there are few differences
between French- and Dutch-speakers in the perception and tolerance of corruption. We
then list a number of variables that can explain corruption in Belgium and argue that
the independent effect of federalism is very limited. Next we demonstrate that
federalism has played a much more significant role in lowering the risk of policy failure,
while at the same time creating a few new vulnerabilities. Finally, we argue that the
regional political elites do not often engage in policy learning and frequently put
forward federalism as the main solution to the avoidance of policy failure and scandal.
In this sense, regional political elites do not seize the opportunity for policy
experimentation and transfer that is generally seen as one of the main virtues of a
federal system of government.
Belgian politics seemed to have become synonymous with corruption,
scandal and policy failure in the 1990s (Maesschalck 2002). The murder of
socialist politician André Cools in 1991 marked the start of a scandal-ridden
decade. The investigation into his killing led to the discovery of the Agusta–
Dassault corruption scandal over bribes that had been paid in the procure-
ment of helicopters for the military. The scandal caused the indictment of
several politicians and forced the resignation of NATO Secretary-General
and former Belgian Vice-PrimeMinisterWilly Claes. The Dutroux scandal in
the mid-1990s had an even greater impact on the country’s national mood
and international image. The perceived incompetence of the police and the
judiciary in dealing with a major paedophilia and child murder case led to
massive popular outrage, reaching a peak in the ‘White March’ in Brussels:
the largest protest march in Belgian post-war history. In 1999, it appeared
that the administration had been unable to detect or prevent contamination
of poultry, leading to the so-called dioxin scandal. Since the scandal emerged
just before the elections, it contributed to a historic shift in the ruling
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coalition, with the Christian Democrats moving to the opposition benches
for the first time in decades. These are just a few illustrations of the size and
the impact of scandals in 1990s Belgium.
In this article we distinguish between corruption, policy failure (or fiasco)
and scandal. Friedrich defines the first as ‘deviant behaviour associated with
a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense’
(Friedrich 1989: 15). As we emphasise political corruption, we will parti-
cularly focus on such deviant behaviour that implicates public officials.
Compared with corruption, policy failure is a much broader concept, since it
can mean ‘a negative event that is perceived by a socially and politically
significant group of people in the community to be at least partially caused by
avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymakers’ (Bovens and ‘t
Hart 1996). As such, policy failures can occur without malicious intent. In
the examples listed above, the Agusta–Dassault bribes exemplify corruption;
the failures in the Dutroux investigation illustrate a policy failure or fiasco.
Finally, we consider scandal as a social and political construction that might
be triggered by policy failure or fiasco. Many problems are not followed by
scandal (Thompson 2000) and sometimes scandals are triggered by occur-
rences that, in other circumstances, would hardly be seen as problematic.
Seeking to provide a thorough explanation of the occurrence of corrup-
tion, policy failure and scandal in 1990s Belgium would be inappropriately
ambitious within the scope of the present article. Of all three occurrences, this
article will focus particularly on corruption. Furthermore, we will mainly
emphasise the explanatory value of two variables. The first variable considers
to what extent the (perception) of corruption is related to the coexistence of
two different political cultures (Flemish and Walloon) in one state. Using
survey data, we will analyse whether the Flemish are more prone to corrupt
behaviour than the Walloons or vice versa. The second variable is the key
variable linking the various contributions in this volume: federalism. Has the
federalisation of Belgium, and, in particular, the peculiar structure which
Belgian federalism acquired, affected the (perception) of corruption, policy
failure and scandal? Or has Belgian federalism changed the institutions in such
a way that they become more vulnerable to corruption, failure and scandal?
(See Boin and ‘t Hart 2000 for the notion of ‘institutional vulnerability’.)
How Corrupt is Belgium?
While qualitative analysis of the types of corruption occurring in Belgium
has been made elsewhere (e.g. De Winter 2003; De Ruyver et al. 1999), we
will focus on quantitative data. Between 1973 and 2003, De Winter (2003)
counted about 100 important political corruption cases in Belgium. In 2003,
56.2 per cent of the Flemish agreed that you need ‘connections’ to get
something done by government or the public administration, and just 13.4
per cent disagreed (Van de Walle 2007). Detailed empirical research on
corruption in Belgium is scarce, however. In a European comparative




































































perspective, perceptions of corruption in Belgium are quite high. In the 2005
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Belgium was
ranked 19th (http://www.transparency.org), above only Spain, Portugal and
Italy out of the other Western European countries. ‘Scandalitis’ is a word
that refers to an atmosphere of constant scandals, and was regularly used
with reference to Belgian politics in the 1990s. But is Belgium’s image of
being a corrupt state correct, and why is corruption perceived to be higher in
Belgium than in, say, Sweden?
Figure 1 shows the development in perceived corruption in Belgium. The
right-hand vertical scale indicates the country’s score on the Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index, where 10 stands for low levels
of perceived corruption. The left-hand scale shows answers from the
Flemish administration’s yearly surveys on social and cultural change
(http://aps.vlaanderen.be). A representative sample of respondents in the
Flemish Region (n¼ about 1,500) had to pick from a list of 22 potential
problems the five most important ones. In 1997, almost 40 per cent included
(political) corruption in this list, while 6.5 per cent of respondents identified
corruption as the most important problem. The figure suggests a change to
lower levels of perceived corruption or at least a return to normalcy after a
period of high perceived corruption.
Judicial statistics show a similar trend. Yante (2003) analysed judicial sta-
tistics before 1993, and found a clear decrease in the number of convictions for
administrative corruption in the period between 1985 and 1992 as compared
FIGURE 1
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION IN BELGIUM-FLANDERS, 1996–2005
Source: Administratie Planning en Statistiek (http://aps.vlaanderen.be) and Transparency International (http://
www.transparency.org).




































































to the preceding periods. At the same time, he observed a tendency towards
more severe punishment, albeit many cases of active corruption only lead to a
probationary sentence. More recent judicial statistics confirm this downward
trend (Figure 2). Obviously, these statistics only refer to cases where
corruption was actually discovered, reported, investigated and punished.
In the second round of the European Social Survey (ESS), 1,778 Belgians
were interviewed on a broad range of issues (Jowell et al. 2005). The survey
also included a number of items on corruption and bribery. Unsurprisingly,
for reasons of social desirability, the number of respondents admitting to
having offered a bribe to public officials is very low (just 14 people out of
1,770 over the past five years). However, the number of experiences with
public officials asking for a bribe is equally low. A similar phenomenon has
been reported with regard to experienced corruption in interactions with
police officers (Van Kesteren et al. 2000). At the same time, however, the
2004 survey on social and cultural change in Flanders revealed that 17.5 per
cent of Flemish citizens thought that many or almost everyone in the public
administration was involved in corruption (Carton et al. 2005). Hence, there
seems to be a difference between actual experience of corruption and the
general image or perception.
The ESS surveys not only asked about actual occurrence of corruption,
but also about attitudes. When asked how they evaluate a public official
asking someone for a favour or bribe in return for their services, 94 per cent
of Belgians answer that they consider this wrong. This percentage is similar
FIGURE 2
CONVICTIONS FOR ACTIVE AND PASSIVE BRIBERY IN BELGIUM, 1993–2003
Source: FOD Justitie, Dienst Strafrechterlijk Beleid, Statistisch Steunpunt (http://www.dsb-spc.be).




































































to that for the other countries which participated in the ESS. A similar
question in the 1999–2000 European Values Survey did not reveal much
between-country variation either. The ESS statement on whether you should
always strictly obey the law even if this means missing good opportunities,
however, showed the Belgians to be the most flexible of nations, with just 47
per cent agreeing. This is over 17 percentage points below the average for 17
European countries. This is quite interesting, especially when compared to
the findings on attitudes to bribe-taking reported above. Yet there are
variations in the attitudes towards corruption. The 1995 Belgian General
Election Study revealed that Belgians have more problems with politicians
asking for money for granting government contracts than with politicians
who merely accept money. Also, corruption was considered worse when
these politicians used the money for their personal election campaign as
compared to when they gave it to their party (Beerten et al. 1997).
In sum, although survey evidence of attitudes towards, and occurrence of,
corruption shows some differences with other European countries, there is
no strong evidence that Belgium would be as dramatically corrupt as is
sometimes suggested. The limited evidence available also suggests a down-
ward trend since the late 1990s. When it comes to corruption perception,
Belgium tends to score fairly low in a European perspective, but perception-
based data should always be interpreted with great caution.
Are there Regional Differences in Attitudes towards Corruption?
Pujas and Rhodes (1999a: 689) wonder whether there is a clean north and a
corrupt south in Europe, or whether there is a ‘southern syndrome’ (1999b:
41). They show how the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index suggests the existence of two groups of countries in Europe: a northern
Protestant one and a southern Catholic one. Yet, they conclude, this does not
explain why some countries have managed to eradicate corruption while
others, geographically close, have not. They define Belgium as a northern
country and have difficulties in explaining high levels of perceived corruption.
A more common argument, however, is that Belgium is on the border
between the two groups, consisting of two separated administrative cultures
(see also Brans et al. this volume): a southern one in French-speaking
Wallonia, and a northern one in Dutch-speaking Flanders, although traces
of a ‘southern’ culture are also said to be found in, until recently largely
Catholic, Flanders. If this is the case, different approaches to corruption
should be found in the two regions: high corruption and high acceptance in
the south, and lower corruption and lower acceptance in the north.
Differences in Perceived Corruption
We first test whether corruption is perceived differently by Dutch- and
French-speakers. We rely on data from the 1995 and 2003 Belgian General




































































Election Studies,1 because of the large samples. The 1995 study contains
several corruption-related issues, inspired by a series of corruption scandals
in the first half of the 1990s. The 2003 survey contained a question on the
perceived extent of bribe-taking among politicians. Rather than merely
looking at the region in which respondents reside (Flanders, Wallonia,
Brussels), we use the language in which the interview was conducted,
precisely because we want to look at differences in political culture, which
correspond more to linguistic than territorial lines. We first test differences
in perceived corruption and then look at differences in public attitudes
towards corruption.
When looking at the 1995 survey, French- and Dutch-speakers clearly
differ in their perception of political corruption: French-speakers are more
likely to state that politicians are more corrupt than other people (see Table
1). This difference remains significant when controlling for sex, age,
education and income. Also in the 2003 survey, French-speakers perceive
political corruption in Belgium to be considerably higher than Dutch-
speakers (see Table 2). Language remains an important determinant of
perceived corruption after controlling for sex, education, and age.
Differences in Attitudes towards Corruption
In the 1999 European Values Study (Inglehart et al. 2005), a question was
included on the justifiability of accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties.
Two-thirds of the Belgians thought this could never be justified (one on a
TABLE 2
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION AMONG POLITICIANS IN BELGIUM, ACCORDING TO
LANGUAGE OF RESPONDENT, 2003
How widespread do you think corruption such as
bribe taking is among politicians in Belgium? French Dutch
Very widespread 50.4 24.5
Quite widespread 42.6 55.2
Not very widespread 3.1 15.4
It hardly happens at all 3.9 4.8
Source: Belgian General Election Study 2003 (N¼ 2,225).
TABLE 1
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION AMONG POLITICIANS IN BELGIUM, ACCORDING TO
LANGUAGE OF RESPONDENT, 1995
French Dutch
Politicians more corrupt than other people 41.5 30.2
Politicians less corrupt than other people 1.6 2.7
Politicians not more or less corrupt than other people 56.9 67.1
Source: Belgian General Election Study 1995 (N¼ 3,557), weighted for region, age and sex.




































































one to ten scale), and only a small minority was tolerant towards accepting
bribes. There is, however, a small but significant difference between French-
and Dutch-speakers, with the French-speakers more often opting for the
extreme option (75.6 per cent never justified), and the Dutch speakers more
often found in categories 2–6 (62.1 per cent in category 1). In a multivariate
analysis including socio-economic status, age, sex, education and the size of
one’s town, language remains the main determinant of attitudes towards
bribes. We find a similar trend in the 1995 General Election Study: French-
speakers consider different types of political corruption (politicians accept-
ing or asking money for government contracts, for personal use, or for party
use) less acceptable than Dutch-speakers, again controlling for socio-
demographics in a multivariate analysis (sex, age, education and income).
Finally, the 2005 European Social Survey also contained a number of
items related to corrupt behaviour. Two of these were briefly discussed
above: how respondents evaluate a public official asking someone for a bribe
in return for their services, and what respondents think about the statement
‘you should always strictly obey the law even if this means missing good
opportunities’. Figures 3 and 4 disaggregate the responses for the three
Regions. In the Flemish Region, 1,028 people were interviewed, in the
Walloon Region 597 and in the Brussels Region 153.
Bivariate analysis shows differences between the three Regions in
Belgium, with inhabitants of the Flemish Region being slightly more
tolerant towards public officials asking for bribes. The Flemish were also
less likely to agree that one should always strictly obey the law even if it
FIGURE 3
ATTITUDES TOWARDS OBEYING THE LAW: YOU SHOULD ALWAYS OBEY THE
LAW




































































means missing good opportunities. The differences remain (albeit small),
when controlling for a number of socio-demographics such as gender,
education, age and self-reported level of urbanisation of domicile.
In conclusion, French-speaking Belgians seem to perceive more corrup-
tion than their Dutch-speaking counterparts, but tolerance towards corrup-
tion is lower among French-speakers. As for the latter, it is unclear whether
the difference in tolerance is due to political culture or to a reaction against
higher levels of perceived corruption. However, the small differences that do
exist repeatedly falsify the proposition of a Flemish culture, which, because
of its adherence to a northern political culture would be less tolerant
towards corruption. This interesting observation is an obvious avenue for
further research into the actual prevalence of corruption in the two parts of
the country. In any case, bearing in mind the small differences between the
two language communities, we can conclude that there is at first sight little
indication of a clash of political cultures when it comes to corruption and
that it may be hard to explain corruption by referring to regional culture.
Explaining Corruption
In line with the focus of this volume, we want to investigate whether
Belgian-style federalism could go some way in explaining why the 1990s saw
several cases of corruption. Yet, before we delve into federalism, we would
list a few factors that are frequently mentioned as contributing or contextual
factors to explaining corruption in Belgium.
FIGURE 4
ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBERY
Source: European Social Survey, round 2, 2005.




































































First and foremost, many authors refer to the complex of interrelated
cultural factors that include fairly low trust in democratic institutions (e.g.
Van de Walle 2007), relatively high tolerance towards breaking the law (e.g.
Gibson and Caldeira 1996), and a culture of clientelistic relations between
politicians and their voters for both individual favours and advantages for
their constituency. Factors like these create a context that facilitates corrupt
practices.
Second, in each of the Belgian regions, political parties and their presi-
dents play a pivotal role. Until the end of the 1980s, the governing parties
strongly controlled promotion in the civil service (De Winter 2003: 99),
thus creating a possible avenue for dubious dependencies between politics
and individual administrators. Political parties also had a strong impact
on actual policy-making, particularly through the ministerial cabinets: the
ministers’ personal political advisors, often former party officials, seconded
public servants or representatives of interest groups (see e.g. Pelgrims 2001).
‘[A]s they are central to departmental decision-making and are staffed by
party loyalists, ministerial cabinets are evidently useful sites for organizing
illicit activities’ (De Winter 2003: 99).
Third, in an analysis of corruption in Belgium, Frognier (1986) considered
consociationalist systems as more prone to corruption. Likewise, Lijphart,
in his analysis of consociational systems, pointed out that ‘it may be hypothe-
sised that the greater clarity of responsibilities in majoritarian democracies
inhibits corruption and that the consensus system’s tendency to compromise
and ‘‘deal-making’’ fosters corrupt practices’ (Lijphart 1999: 289). Yet his
empirical analysis of 36 countries did not reveal significant effects. Pujas
and Rhodes (1999a) also argue that political competition does not func-
tion properly in a consociational system, because inter-party agreement is
bought, and because there is no real control when you always cooperate
with the same people. The ruling group will thus insulate itself from outside
scrutiny, even if many parties are involved (Frognier 1986). The strong
distinction between the ideological pillars in the Belgian consociational
system, which have lived on after the federalisation of Belgium, and the
close ties between a political party and a diversity of organisations within
the same pillar (trade unions, public health bodies, professional organisa-
tions, and even market actors such as banks, architects or firms) lead to
long-term alliances that are sensitive to political corruption, particularly
when parties required extensive funding. For example, investigations into
the role of Leo Delcroix in a number of high-profile scandals revealed that,
as party secretary for the Flemish Christian Democrat party, he was at the
centre of a network of friendly companies that also involved dubious forms
of party financing.
Fourth, party fragmentation could in theory decrease opportunities for
corruption, as complex coalition governments require more actors to be
bribed and there is a higher risk of one of the parties blowing the whistle
on illicit behaviour. Yet, although Belgium has one of the most fragmented




































































party systems in Europe (see De Winter et al. this volume), for two reasons,
it is very doubtful that this had a negative impact on corruption. For
starters, party fragmentation coincided with spiralling costs in election
campaigning, contributing to the Agusta–Dassault and a number of other
party finance scandals (De Winter 2000). Furthermore, all the main parties
seemed to share the fear of a ‘chain of denunciation’ (Frognier 1986) and
thus ‘signed’ an ‘implicit non-aggression pact’ (De Winter 2003: 98) prohi-
biting the reporting of corrupt behaviour.
Some recent changes justify cautious optimism. A very important factor
was a law in 1989 reducing the need for (illicit) party financing by strongly
increasing government donations and capping the cost of election camp-
aigns. Moreover, the 1990s saw a significant decrease in the politicisation
of the judiciary and the administration through independent assessments
of candidates. Meanwhile, administrations at different levels are experimen-
ting with preventive measures of ethics management (Maesschalck 2005).
A whistle-blowing act has been approved at the Flemish level (Maesschalck
and Ornelis 2003) and is under consideration at the federal level. In the
spring of 2006, a number of scandals were uncovered involving political
and administrative behaviour in both Flanders and Wallonia in the past.
Devastating as these revelations are, this behaviour is now public and
appears to have stopped, which is a positive sign.
The reasons that are listed above fall beyond the scope of federalism. Yet
would federalism, Belgian-style, have had an independent effect on the
incidence of corruption? In the literature the empirical evidence of a link
between federalism and corruption is shaky at best, and there are theoretical
arguments to both support and reject such a relationship. For instance,
using perception indicators, Treisman (2000: 401) found federal states to be
more corrupt than unitary states. He also found that ‘countries with more
tiers of government tend to have higher perceived corruption’ (Treisman
2002: 1), but the results were not straightforward. Federalism effects often
disappear when other variables are included in the models (Bohara et al.
2004). This paragraph briefly discusses two mechanisms through which fed-
eralism might have an impact on corruption.
The first mechanism refers to proximity. Federalism is said to bring
government closer to the people. This has at least two, contradictory, effects.
Proximity increases accountability and control and might thus reduce
corruption. Yet at the same time it stimulates more frequent and closer inter-
action and thus more opportunity for corruption (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman
2004). The relevance of this mechanism for Belgium will depend on how one
interprets proximity. First, if one focuses on the quantitative dimension of
the argument and on literal proximity in the sense of close interaction
between political and bureaucratic officials and citizens, then the relevance
seems very limited. Population size of the regions suggests it probably does
not matter all that much whether we are dealing with a federalised or a
unitary Belgian state. While Belgium has almost 10.5 million inhabitants (as




































































of July 2005), the Flemish Region still has 6 million, and the Walloon 3.4
million. It is therefore unlikely that this federalism or regionalism would
lead to greater proximity between citizens and politicians.
Furthermore, one could also interpret proximity in terms of values and
political culture. In this sense, proximity might indeed have the two contra-
dictory effects mentioned above. On the one hand, if principal (electorate)
and agent (political and bureaucratic officials) share more values, it will be
easier for the former to control the latter. On the other hand, shared values
could make it easier for both parties in the interaction to actually engage in
corrupt practices, because the availability of information on the other’s
motives and values lowers transaction costs and the risks of a corrupt
encounter. Yet this argument only holds for Belgium if there are significant
differences between the two main communities in political culture and
particularly in attitudes towards corruption. Evidence for the latter is, as we
discussed above, very weak.
The second mechanism refers to the increased competition that federalism
allegedly creates. Public choice approaches attribute high levels of corrup-
tion to a lack of competition in the political arena, because competition is
said to reduce politicians’ discretionary power and ‘diminish the value of
bribing officials’ (Bohara et al. 2004: 485). Thus, because of its scattered
power structure, a federal structure requires that a large number of actors
are bribed instead of just one, making it more difficult to influence decisions,
but possibly leading to an increase in the total number of corrupt deeds
(Treisman 2000: 407). Also, because there is a larger number of actors to
extract bribes from the population or other actors (Treisman 2000: 433),
political competition (both within and between parties) is likely to have the
effect of keeping the level of bribes low (Shleifer and Vishny 1993: 610). Yet
competition in a federal structure can also increase corruption: it makes
constituents or clients less dependent on politicians or bureaucrats, because
they can replace politicians or bring their case to another bureaucrat
(Montinola and Jackman 2002: 147, 151). In a (federal) system with much
political competition one only needs to bribe a segment of government to
influence decisions.
In order to assess the relevance of these arguments about increased
competition for the case of Belgian federalism, it is important to distinguish
between those policies that are still entirely assigned to the national level (e.g.
defence), policy areas which are shared by the regional and federal levels (e.g.
employment) and policies which are entirely regional (e.g. education).
First, the arguments above are clearly relevant for those policy areas that
are still entirely at the federal level, since federal decisions require the
agreement of the two major language communities and the non-state-wide
parties represented in the federal coalition government. However, these
mechanisms were present at the outset of Belgium’s federalisation process
(see Deschouwer this volume) and therefore cannot be attributed to the
latter as such.




































































Second, Belgian federalism minimises the occurrence of shared, or con-
current, competencies (although different slices of a policy area, such as
employment policy, are often attributed to different levels of government).
‘Joint-decision’ federations may increase the likelihood of corruption, since
they make more officials, with less decisive power and with allegiances to
different (levels of) government(s) responsible for policy implementation.
Third, the arguments presented above are not relevant for those policy
areas in which the regions have gained full competence. In fact, one could
argue that, compared with the situation prior to federalisation, the number
of actors to be bribed has been reduced and their decision-making power
increased. In the Belgian unitary state, the decision to initiate a large public
infrastructure project required a complex balancing of regional interests (as
is still the case for the federal policies described above). Yet ‘waffle-iron’
strategies became redundant in competencies that are entirely regional, as
decision-makers gained the power and the budget to tailor policies to their
own needs. The balancing act for these devolved competencies is thus much
less complex and mainly depends on agreement within the governing
coalition at the regional level, leading to fewer potentially corruptible
decision-makers, but with more power. On the other hand, the federalisa-
tion of Belgium initially reduced competition at the regional level. Without
directly elected regional parliaments until 1995, federalisation contributed to
strengthening the power of some pillar parties in the region in which they
received most electoral support. For instance, in Wallonia, federalisation
consolidated the hegemony of the Parti Socialiste and in Flanders it initially
strengthened the role of the Christian Democrats. Traditionally, these are
the strongest pillar parties which maintain strong links to a number of
important auxiliary associations in health and education policy.
The Impact of Federalism on Policy Failure in Belgium
Federalism was introduced in Belgium to prevent the reoccurrence of a
number of policy failures that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. We will
discuss these failures by means of a typology of three typical ‘general failure
types’ that was developed by Boin and ‘t Hart (2000). They explain how
these failure types (respectively crisis by ignorance, crisis by rigidity and
crisis by failed intervention) act as endemic factors that contribute to a
legitimacy gap between societal norms and performance and thus to policy
failure. When applying this framework to Belgium, we can see how
federalism was introduced as a means to avoid crises of all three general
failure types.
First, a crisis by ignorance occurs when ‘the dominant coalition in the
sector fails to identify an externally perceived need for adaptation or reform’
(Boin and ‘t Hart 2000). It is not difficult to find policy fields that have been
neglected as a consequence of the political elite’s occupation with the
federalisation process in the 1970s and 1980s. During the Dutroux crisis in




































































the mid-1990s, for example, many senior politicians admitted that problems
in the police and justice sector had been largely ignored because the political
elites were preoccupied with federalisation. For the same reason, adminis-
trative reform was long kept off the political agenda (Van de Walle et al.
2005; Brans et al. this volume).
A crisis by rigidity occurs ‘when environmental changes are noted and
understood, but the dominant coalition in the sector is unable to go beyond
gradualist adaptation in its response’ (Alink et al. 2001: 297). Despite its
unitary status, pre-1970 Belgium was already marred with ideological,
sociological and linguistic cleavages which regularly paralysed decision-
making in the centre. Change was only possible through small incremental
steps, leading to an equilibrium that was only infrequently punctuated by a
pact. Although such pacts could pave the way for more drastic changes, these
often arrived at the expense of enormous political efforts. An example of an
area where this immobilism as a consequence of the complex structure
occurred is the field of public finance and particularly the growing national
debt. Although most actors realised the need for drastic cutbacks, the
complex Belgian system did not allow for the kind of serious measures that
were necessary, particularly in a context where problems were often solved by
throwing money at them, for example in the ‘waffle iron’ tradition. Federali-
sation has reduced this complexity, creating more room for decisive action
when needed (admittedly, the budgetary criteria imposed by the Maastricht
Treaty also played an important role in enforcing budgetary discipline).
Finally, a crisis by failed intervention occurs when problems are addres-
sed in the wrong way: ‘applying the wrong solutions to the right problem
or applying the right solutions to the wrong problem’ (Boin and ‘t Hart
2000). Despite variations in political culture and socio-economic develop-
ment, the unitary state did not create much room for policy differentia-
tion. A good policy for one part of the country could take the form of a
failed intervention for the other, for example, because the economic
circumstances were entirely different. Federalisation enabled more focused
and appropriate policies, at least for those policies in which the regions
gained exclusive competence, reducing the chance of such types of failed
intervention.
Yet, although federalisation may have reduced the chance of policy
failures, federalism is not without risks either. First, a new version of a crisis
of ignorance becomes possible. In those policy areas where competencies are
clearly assigned to the regional level, there is a risk that the regions will
develop their own idiosyncratic policies without knowing anything about
policies in the other region, thus forgoing the opportunity for synergies or
running the risk of contradictory policies. Other than at the federal level,
there is little room for regular interaction between politicians representing
the two language groups and the (linguistically) split media do not report
extensively on the policies of the region that is associated with the other
language group.




































































Second, a new form of the crisis of rigidity also becomes possible. Having
fought so long to acquire some competencies, regions may be very protective
of them, rigidly following their own convictions even if it is obvious that an
open-minded and flexible cooperation with the other region or the federal
level would drastically increase policy effectiveness. Policy areas which are
scattered between various levels or governments (such as environmental
policy) are particularly prone to such risk, as the Belgian federal model
cannot force the regions into binding cooperation agreements (see Swenden
and Jans this volume). Furthermore, the Flemish government, in particular,
may be prone to such behaviour, as it emphasises a rhetoric of ‘wat we zelf
doen doen we beter’ (‘what we do ourselves, we do better’). Systematic policy
coordination only takes place in areas that are deeply affected by
Europeanisation (see Beyers and Bursens this volume) and a widely shared
attitude of ‘Bundestreue’ (federal comity) is still missing from the Belgian
federal context.
The Impact of Federalism on Scandal in Belgium
Despite the media’s focus on the facts behind a scandal, most authors do
not see scandals as exceptional events, emanating from an objective fact or
change. The 1990s featured a high incidence of scandals, not only in Belgium,
but also elsewhere in the West. Most authors treat scandals as constructions,
and point at the political opportunity structure as an explanation for their
emergence: ‘The appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a
fact or a rare situation’ (Edelman 1988: 31).
The Belgian case seems to be no exception to this apparent broader trend
of scandal-proneness. The early 1990s saw the emergence of a discourse on
‘the confidence gap’ between citizen and government. The phrase was coined
by then opposition politician (and since 1999 federal Prime Minister) Guy
Verhofstadt and assumed its full strength as a widely shared problem
definition after the dramatic 1991 elections, in which the extreme right-
wing party Vlaams Blok gained a spectacular increase in votes. Situations
previously not generally defined as problematic suddenly became so. The air
was filled with cries for a ‘New Political Culture’ that would eradicate power
politics, and do away with much of the backroom decision-making.
Not all Belgian scandals in the 1990s can simply be reduced to changes in
sensitivity or expectations, or to the political games that constructed them.
The Agusta–Dassault corruption revelations followed the murder of
socialist politician André Cools, the first national politician to be murdered
in Belgium since communist leader Julien Lahaut in 1950. Rumour spread
that the murder was related to a broad culture of fraud and corruption, and
even mafia involvement. Despite the actual killers being imprisoned, no satis-
factory motive has been found for the murder, but many corrupt practices
have been uncovered during the investigation. This makes the Agusta case
different from more ‘mainstream’ corruption cases.




































































The abuse and killing of several young girls by a well-known and
previously convicted sex offender, Marc Dutroux, hardly can be qualified
as an average policy failure either. Against the background of the huge
public outrage surrounding his arrest in 1996 and a widely held (but never
proved) assumption that there were networks of powerful people who
protected him, his short-lived accidental escape in April 1998 counts as one
of the most absurd and shocking events in the history of Belgian criminal
policy.
We now turn to federalism and its potential impact on three different
stages in the development of a scandal: problem definition, scandal expan-
sion and scandal coping or solution. With regard to problem definition, one
should note that not all problems become scandals. Brändström and
Kuipers (2003) identified the violation of crucial ‘core values’ as a prerequi-
site for incidents to develop into crises and to initiate a process of blaming.
In Belgium, many problems are framed as resulting from deep-rooted differ-
ences in political culture, especially when it comes to issues of corruption or
the management of public sector institutions. As such, the attempt to accen-
tuate differences in political culture rather than federalism as an institutional
variable underpins the making of several scandals. Above, we suggested
that survey evidence for the existence of different regional attitudes towards
corruption is weak. Yet the two language communities have deep-rooted
stereotypes of each other, and frequently refer to these in the political dis-
course. Any event that confirms these stereotypes (e.g. ‘a corrupt south’)
has a higher propensity to draw attention, and to develop into a scandal.
In fact, recent years show that virtually all public policy issues can be
framed in terms of a Flemish–Walloon juxtaposition, from administrative
reform to tobacco advertising on sports events or the right of non-EU
citizens to vote.
The rise of the extreme right in Flanders further contributed to this
development. Since the arrival of the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok/
Belang, cases of corruption are now widely used to generate political conflict.
As a permanent opposition party (at least until now), the Vlaams Belang has
no interest in maintaining the cosy backroom politics associated with
consociationalism and thus has its hands free to frame any problematic
occurrence as a scandal. Moreover, the party’s extreme Flemish nationalist
stance typically leads it to frame problems in terms of a clean Flanders that
is deprived of its means by a corrupt and lazy south. Yet this rhetoric is not
confined to extreme right parties. Regional identity has become a major
element in the political game, and in the party-political game, often in a
misguided attempt to win back votes from the extreme right.
With regard to an increase in scandal, it is noted that growing political
competition has a great effect on this. However, as discussed above,
federalism has not necessarily increased competition in the Belgian political
system, certainly not until 2003, when federal elections were decoupled for
the first time from regional elections. Even the strength of the extreme right




































































in Flanders seems to have a double, contradictory effect on the level of
scandal. On the one hand, they take a strong interest in expanding scandals,
thus increasing pressure on the other parties to arrive at a ‘collective
definition of the deviance as scandalous’ (Sherman 1978: 64). On the other
hand, by their quantitative strength (and as a consequence of the so-called
cordon sanitaire, that is, the agreement of all the other parties not to enter in
coalition with the Vlaams Belang), they force virtually all traditional parties
together in coalition governments, thus effectively reducing the scope for
competition between those parties.
Finally, as a young multi-ethnic federal state, debates about the future
development of the federal system feature prominently in the political dis-
course, no matter what is the policy issue at hand. In the bipolar Belgian
federation, Belgian political actors (particularly in Flanders) routinely and
systematically present more federalism as the means to put emerging
scandals to rest. This creates the risk that other, potentially more relevant,
solutions are routinely overlooked.
Conclusion: So what has Federalism to do with it?
Our analysis suggests that Belgian federalism has a limited impact on
the occurrence of corruption, policy failure and scandal. With regard to the
former, we demonstrated differences in the acceptance of corruption
between the two different language communities. Yet we could not present
objective data to demonstrate that corruption is more frequent in Flanders
than in Wallonia or vice versa. Other factors, such as the escalating needs
for party finance in the 1980s and the consociational elitist political system
which has been governed by a ‘junta of party presidents’, are likely to play a
much larger role in explaining why Belgium often suffers from a corrupt
image. However, federalism may have created some favourable conditions
insofar as it reduced the complexity of political decision-making in the
regions and increased electoral accountability. The decoupling of federal
and regional elections increased opportunities to ‘throw out the rascals’.
On the other hand, in Flanders, the cordon sanitaire effectively reduced the
levels of political competition by forcing all the other political parties
(except for the Greens) into a grand coalition government.
The process of federalising Belgium absorbed much energy of the political
leaders and put a brake on necessary reforms, for instance in the police and
justice sectors, thereby increasing incidences of policy failure. Although still
an ongoing process, the scope of competencies that are fit for decentralisa-
tion (other than social security and health) is much reduced, and the regions
can expend more energy to tailor policy solutions to the political preferences
of the regional electorates they represent. The low incidence of shared policy
competencies in the Belgian federation further increases the scope for policy
divergence and experimentation. On the other hand, infrequent interaction
between regional governments which cross-cut the language divide and a




































































desire of the Flemish to ‘do things their way’ constrain opportunities for
policy transfer and learning. Frequently, more regional autonomy is seen as
the best solution to policy failure and scandal, whereas alternative and
potentially more cost-efficient solutions are often overlooked.
Our analysis suggests that many of the undesirable consequences that are
commonly attributed to federalism might in fact be due to the coexistence
of different cultures in Belgium, independent of federalism. Yet this claim
remains only a hypothesis and is an obvious avenue for further research.
Hard evidence of how the presence of different political cultures affects
policy failures and scandal remains very limited, mainly because empirical
research on inter-regional differences in civil and political culture is lacking.
Most research comparing the regions focuses on differences in national/
regional or ethno-territorial identities (e.g. Billiet et al. 2003; De Winter
et al. 1998), not on attitudes towards corruption or similar issues. Therefore,
this would be an important avenue for further research.
Focusing on one explanatory variable, as we did with federalism, always
carries a certain risk of bias, an exaggeration of the power of the variable to
explain the dependent variables (corruption, policy failures and scandal) to
the detriment of other potential explanatory variables. We have made efforts
to avoid such biases, for example by referring to the impact of
depillarisation and the rise of the extreme right, but an obvious avenue
for further research consists of more thorough analyses that are system-
atically open for other explanations. The latter could include theoretically
codified narrative accounts (see e.g. Maesschalck 2002 for such an analysis
of the Dutroux scandal and its impact on police reform) or could rather
focus on a limited number of explanatory factors, based on the study of a
fairly large number of cases (see e.g. Bovens et al. 2001).
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Pujas, Véronique, and Martin Rhodes (1999b). ‘Party Finance and Political Scandal in Italy,
Spain and France’, West European Politics, 22:3, 41–63.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2004). ‘The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption’,
Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper.
Sherman, Lawrence W. (1978). Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny (1993). ‘Corruption’, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108:3, 599–617.
Thompson, John B. (2000). Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Treisman, David (2000). ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, Journal of Public
Economics, 76, 399–457.
Treisman, David (2002). ‘Decentralization and the Quality of Government’, unpublished paper,
UCLA.
Van de Walle, Steven (2007). ‘Perceptions of Corruption as Distrust? Cause and Effect in
Attitudes Towards Government’, in Leo Huberts, Carole Jurkiewicz and Jeroen Maesschalck
(eds.), Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives across Frontiers. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, forthcoming.
Van de Walle, Steven, Nick Thijs and Geert Bouckaert (2005). ‘A Tale of Two Charters:
Political Crisis, Political Realignment and Administrative Reform in Belgium’, Public
Management Review, 7:3, 367–90.
Van Kesteren, J.N., P. Mayhew and P. Nieuwbeerta (2000). Criminal Victimisation in
Seventeen Industrialised Countries: Key-Findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims
Survey. The Hague: Ministry of Justice, WODC.
Yante, Jean-Marie (2003). ‘La Corruption dans l’Administration belge aux XIXe et XXe
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